Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in Twenty-First Century America: The  Shameful  Return of  Scarlet Letter  Punishments in \u3cem\u3eU.S. v. Gementera\u3c/em\u3e by Ziel, Paul
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 19 | Issue 2 Article 9
3-1-2005
Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in
Twenty-First Century America: The "Shameful"
Return of "Scarlet Letter" Punishments in U.S. v.
Gementera
Paul Ziel
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Ziel, Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in Twenty-First Century America: The "Shameful" Return of "Scarlet Letter"
Punishments in U.S. v. Gementera, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 499 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol19/iss2/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
499 
 
Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in 
Twenty-First Century America: The “Shameful” Return 
of “Scarlet Letter” Punishments in U.S. v. Gementera 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s timeless classic, The Scarlet Letter, 
highlighted the shaming punishments and public humiliation tactics 
commonly employed in colonial America. Few who have read this 
masterpiece could forget the tragic journey of the novel’s central 
character, Hester Prynne, who exemplifies shaming punishments. Hester 
committed the unthinkable crime of bearing a child out of wedlock and 
subsequently received a punishment requiring her to display a large 
scarlet letter “A” on her bosom. Today, many Americans would probably 
scoff at punishments creating public spectacles, yet a trend is emerging 
in our courts indicating that the judiciary is beginning to view shaming 
penalties as acceptable punishments. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals asserted the validity of so-called “Scarlet Letter” 
sentences in U.S. v. Gementera.1
In Gementera, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court probation 
requirement that a convicted mail thief must stand outside of a post 
office with a sandwich board sign containing the following message: “I 
stole mail.  This is my punishment.”2 While the Gementera court “is to 
be commended for seeking innovative ways of dealing with a serious 
social problem,”3 sanctioning penalties intended to subject persons to 
humiliation raise substantial concerns. Specifically, the Gementera court 
improperly exercised its authority by imposing a punishment contrary to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were in place at the time of 
this holding.4 In circumventing Congress, Gementera set poor precedent, 
likely created several unintended consequences, and raised substantial 
constitutional concerns. 
 This Note begins with a brief historical perspective of shaming 
punishments in colonial America. Part III outlines the facts, procedural 
 1. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 2. Id. at 598. 
 3. Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D) (2004). Subsequent to the Gementera holding, the 
United States Supreme Court struck down mandatory compliance with the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. See infra Part IV.B. 
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posture, and holding surrounding Gementera. This section also analyzes 
the trend favoring shaming penalties as an alternative form of 
punishment. Part IV argues that the Gementera court improperly usurped 
the legislative powers under the guise that shaming rehabilitates 
offenders. Part V explores the ill-effects and unintended consequences 
that could result from the Gementera court circumventing Congress. Part 
VI analyzes potential constitutional challenges to which “Scarlet Letter” 
sentences may be subject under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Part VII acknowledges the increasing need for alternative 
forms of sentencing and offers a brief conclusion. 
 
II. BACKGROUND OF SHAMING PUNISHMENTS IN AMERICA 
 
A. The Rise of Shaming Sentences in the Colonial American Theocracy 
 
Thoughts of 17th and 18th century America invoke vivid images of 
mindless witch-hunts and public punishment involving stocks and 
pillories.5 Also popular during this period were laws requiring criminals 
to publicly confess their misdeeds6 or display signs and wear letters7 
proclaiming their sins.8 Other punishments actually “involved branding 
the criminal on a visible part of the body, such as the cheek or forehead, 
so as to unmistakably alert the public to the offender’s criminal 
tendencies.”9 Officials conducted these punishments in prominent places 
during busy times of the day for all to see.10
Several theories attempt to explain the popularity of public 
humiliation in colonial times. For example, many historians agree that 
the governing theocracy contributed significantly to this phenomenon.11  
The primary reason why this theocracy fostered an environment in which 
shaming thrived is that it “regarded social status as the highest good.”12 
One commentator also noted that the “citizenry . . . preoccupied itself 
 5. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 612. 
 6. Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light – “Scarlet 
Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America Because It Deprives 
Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001). 
 7. Such as the letter “A” worn by Hester Prynne. 
 8. Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light – “Scarlet 
Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America Because It Deprives 
Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001). 
 9. Id. at 101-02. 
 10. Id. at 101. 
 11. Id. at 102. 
 12. Deni Smith Garcia, Notes & Comments: Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach to the 
Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 109 (1999). 
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with conforming to the common moral norms and rules.”13 These various 
forms of stripping citizens of social standing quickly became effective 
and preferred methods of punishment in this hierarchical society.14
The theocratic system of government is not the only factor 
responsible for the development of shaming penalties in colonial 
America. Communities were small and citizens depended on one another 
for survival.15 Persons living under such circumstances wanted to 
maintain a strong relationship with the community because significant 
hardships accompanied individuals with tainted reputations.16 One 
commentator recognized that “shame penalties led to shunning by the 
community, a high price to pay in . . . close-knit communities.”17 
Shunned colonists endured “the judgmental, jeering eyes of community 
peers with whom they worked and encountered daily.”18
Lack of mobility also contributed to the rise of shaming.19 “Most 
residents were life-long . . . [and] in the mid-seventeenth century, 
migration in and out of Massachusetts’ towns stood at less than one 
percent annually.”20 This factor, along with the governing theocracy and 
the interdependence of the colonial citizenry, combine to explain the 
effectiveness of shaming during this period. These factors quickly 
dissipated in the latter-half of the 18th Century and the beginning of the 
19th Century. 
 
B.  The Rise of Democracy and Corresponding Decline of Shaming 
Sentences 
 
By 1776, the theocracy and social hierarchy of early colonial times 
were notions of the past.21 America had entered a new enlightened era 
best articulated by the Declaration of Independence, stating that “[w]e 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”22 In light of 
this ideological shift, the degradation of the social status of others 
 13. Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light – “Scarlet 
Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America Because It Deprives 
Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 104 (2001). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 102. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (Internal quotes omitted). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 103. 
 21. See Garcia, supra note 12, 109-10. 
 22. The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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became less effective than depriving criminal offenders of their right to 
liberty.23 Incarceration emerged as a more appropriate mode of 
punishment because it directly targeted the highest value, that of liberty, 
as reflected by the new political ideology.24   
In addition to democracy, logistical problems arose with shaming 
that rendered it largely ineffective as a penological scheme.25 Two 
primary factors explain this decline. First, America no longer consisted 
of isolated towns where citizens depended upon each other for 
sustenance.26 Rapid development of urban centers resulted in increased 
anonymity and decreased citizens’ dependence on other individuals and 
their relationships in the community.27 Second, America’s transportation 
infrastructure substantially advanced during this era and individuals 
experienced unprecedented mobility.28 In short, the foundation enabling 
the effectiveness of shaming crumbled and the ideology became archaic. 
Although humiliation as punishment has been disfavored in American 
sentencing for nearly two centuries, an increasing number of courts, 
including the Gementera court, are resorting to the practice as an 
alternative means of punishment. 
 
III.  U.S. V. GEMENTERA 
 
A.  The Facts 
 
A police officer observed Shawn Gementera and his friend Andrew 
Choi taking mail on Fulton Street in San Francisco in May of 2001.29 
Choi quickly stashed letters into his coat while Gementera appeared to 
serve as a lookout.30 The police officer noticed that Gementera said 
 23. Garcia, supra note 12, at 109. 
 24. Morton, supra note 6, at 97, 107. 
        Morton explained the new political ideology as follows: 
The United States’ independence from Britain and its accompanying reformation of penal         
ideology also contributed to the disuse of shaming penalties. The late eighteenth century 
marked a time where a new United States questioned its old forms of punishment in favor of 
other methods, such as incarceration. The optimism accompanying its “fresh start” and 
determination to break away from old methods of punishment peppered with British influence 
helped propel the country out of its habit of using humiliating punishments. As one historian 
observed “the very act of revolution produced a climate conducive to legal change . . . 
[and] . . . the move to criminal incarceration.” 
Id. 
 25. Id. at 105-06. 
 26. Id. at 105. 
 27. Id. at 106. 
 28. Id. at 107. 
 29. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 30. Id.. 
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something to Choi after which the two walked slowly toward the 
officer.31 The officer identified himself and then questioned the pair in 
order to find out whether they lived in the building.32 Gementera 
responded, “Oh, yeah my friend lives there.”33 After Gementera’s 
response, Choi proceeded to get into a car; however, the officer 
immediately ordered them to step away from the car and to lie on the 
ground.34
The officer called for backup and subsequently searched Choi.35 The 
search yielded several letters not addressed to Choi or Gementera on the 
inside of his jacket.36 At this point, the police officer asked Choi whether 
one letter was his to which he replied, “Yes it is.”37 Gementera, 
spontaneously exclaimed: “That black binder in there is not mine, it 
belongs to Andrew . . . I tell you everything.”38 Gementera also 
mentioned that he owned the car that Choi previously attempted to 
enter.39
The Police arrested the duo and searched the car incident to the 
arrest.40 While searching the car, the police discovered the black binder 
to which Gementera previously referred.41 The binder contained a letter 
to an individual located at an address around the corner from where the 
police initially observed Choi and Gementera.42 Additionally, the police 
recovered several checks and tax refunds issued to persons other than 
Choi and Gementera.43 In total, Gementera possessed forty-two pieces of 
stolen mail, “including a U.S. Treasury check worth over $1500.”44  
Gementera eventually plead guilty to mail theft as part of a plea 
agreement.45
Unfortunately, this incident was a continuation of a long-standing 
conflict with the law for Gementera.46 Gementera’s past conduct 
 31. Brief of Appellee, 2004 WL 545743, at 4, U.S. v. Genmentera, 370 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2004) (No.03-10103).
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 4-5. 
 38. Id. at 5 (internal quotes omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing a second count of 
receiving a stolen U.S. Treasury check as part of the plea agreement). 
 46. Id. 
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included misdemeanor criminal mischief,47 driving with a suspended 
license and without proof of financial responsibility,48 misdemeanor 
battery,49 possession of drug paraphernalia,50 taking a vehicle without the 
owner’s consent,51 and other driving offenses.52
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
After the plea agreement, Judge Vaughn Walker of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced 
Gementera.53 Judge Walker considered Gementera’s lengthy criminal 
record and followed the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines”) in sentencing Gementera to two months in prison and three 
years supervised released.54 As part of the supervised release,55 the court 
sentenced Gementera to “perform 100 hours of community service . . . 
[consisting] of standing in front of a postal facility in the city and county 
of San Francisco with a sandwich board which in large letters declares: ‘I 
stole mail.  This is my punishment.’”56
After “inviting both parties to present ‘an alternative form or forms 
of public service that would better comport with the aims of the court,’” 
Judge Walker modified the one hundred hour requirement.57 Instead of 
standing outside several postal facilities for one hundred hours, 
Gementera’s sentence was reduced to standing outside one post office for 
the duration of eight hours.58 Additionally, “[the court] mandated that the 
defendant observe postal patrons visiting the ‘lost or missing mail’ 
window, write letters of apology to any identifiable victims of his crime, 
and deliver several lectures at a local school.”59 Gementera appealed the 
sandwich board condition asserting 1) the supervised release condition 
did not reasonably relate to the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act;60 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (noting that most of Gementera’s driving offenses involved driving on a license 
suspended for his failure to take chemical tests). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 599. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 598-600; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2003). This statute allowed district courts 
broad discretion in creating conditions for supervised release. However, the statue required that 
district court judges meet the legitimate goals of probation set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) 
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and 2) the probation condition violated Gementera’s Constitutional rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.61 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
granted certiorari. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the punishment imposed by the district 
court stating that the sentence “reasonably related to the legitimate 
statutory objective of rehabilitation.”62 In justifying its decision, the court 
further reasoned that “the district court outlined a sensible logic 
underlying its conclusion”63 and included “reintegrative provisions.”64 
The Ninth Circuit also determined that the probation condition failed to 
infringe on Gementera’s Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that 
Gementera “offered no evidence whatsoever . . . that shaming sanctions 
violate contemporary standards of decency.”65
 
C.  Gementera is Indicative of an Emerging Trend 
 
Several states have implemented “Scarlet Letter” punishments over 
the past twenty years. For example, states have used shaming in an effort 
to reduce drunk driving. Successful state humiliation penalties include 
bumper stickers and license plate covers proclaiming messages such as 
“Convicted DUI – Restricted License.”66 Other offenders subjected to 
shaming punishments have been required to post mug shots in local 
newspapers for driving under the influence.67 One court forced a DUI 
offender to wear a pink bracelet stating “D.U.I. CONVICT.”68
DUI offenders are not the only persons subjected to public 
humiliation. Judge Ted Poe of Houston, particularly well known for 
imposing shaming sanctions,69 forced a shoplifter to stand outside a K-
(requiring that judges consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant), (a)(2)(B) (deterrence of future crime), (a)(2)(C) (protecting the 
public), (a)(2)(d) (rehabilitation). 
 61. Gemetera, 379 F.3d at 607.  Although Gemetera based his assertion solely on the Eighth 
Amendment, Amicus argued that the condition violated Gementera’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights in addition to his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 607. Gementera urged the 
Ninth Circuit to consider these assertions as well.  The court, however, declined to inquire into the 
validity of these claims. Id. at 607-08. 
 62. Id. at 607. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 608. 
 66. See Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. App. 1986) (DUI offender required to post 
bumper sticker on car so other motorists know he is driving with a restricted license). 
 67. See Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App. 1992) (DUI offender required to post 
mug shot in local paper with his name and a declaration that he is “DUI-Convicted”). 
 68. See Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 69. See Scott E. Sanders, Note, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are Shame 
Punishments Cruel and Outdated or Are They a Viable Option for American Jurisprudence? 37 
WASHBURN L.J. 359, 367 (1998) (stating Judge Poe is “[o]ne of the most creative, yet controversial, 
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Mart and wear a sign similar to Gementera stating “I stole from this 
store.  Don’t be a thief or this could happen to you.”70 The judge also 
ordered a child molester to post a sign on his door, which read: “No 
children under the age of 18 allowed on these premises by court order.”71 
Another person convicted of perjury paraded in front of the courthouse 
wearing a sign with the message “I lied in court. Tell the truth or walk 
with me.”72 Florida Judge Larry Schack ordered a mother convicted of 
buying drugs in front of her children to take out an ad in the newspaper 
in order to confess her crime.73
Despite the trend growing among some state courts in favor of 
shaming sentences, Gementera is a groundbreaking federal case. As the 
Gementera dissent noted, “[t]here is precious little federal authority on 
sentences that include shaming components . . . .”74 The stringent 
regulations of the Guidelines likely account for the discrepancy between 
shaming sentences in state and federal courts. The Guidelines not only 
help explain the difference between state and federal sentencing but also 
implicate important questions about the validity of the sentence in 
Gementera. 
 
IV.  THE GEMENTERA COURT IMPROPERLY USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE 
BRANCH’S POWER 
 
A.  The Legislative Intent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The Gementera court improperly circumvented the legislative intent 
of the Guidelines, which were in place at the time of this decision, in 
determining that humiliation is “reasonably related to the legitimate 
statutory objective of rehabilitation.”75 The plain language of the 
Guidelines indicates that Congress did not intend for humiliation to be 
part of rehabilitation. Rather than incorporating shame, Congress clearly 
sought to achieve the three goals of deterrence, protection of the public, 
and rehabilitation.76 Furthermore, the Guidelines state that sentences 
need to foster uniformity in sentencing,77 “reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
judges in the nation . . . .”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 368. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 611 (9th Cir. 2004) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 607. 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D) (2004). 
 77. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 606. 
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for the offense.”78 The following sections will show how the Ninth 
Circuit disregarded Congress’s explicit intent and failed to satisfy many 
of the Guidelines’ goals. 
 
B.  Evaluating Gementera in Light of United States v. Booker 
 
It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court recently invalidated 
the mandatory compliance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in two 
landmark companion cases – Booker and Fanfan.79 Writing for the 
majority in part, Justice Breyer noted that the Court’s Booker opinion 
“requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges . . . but it 
permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns 
as well . . . .”80 This Note acknowledges the argument that Gementera 
was wrong because it disregarded the sentencing guidelines is now 
partially moot. However, the logic underpinning this Note’s analysis still 
stands and is relevant for two important reasons. 
First, even though the Guidelines have been reduced to merely 
“advisory” status, humiliation is no less of an important issue. Next, such 
a radical departure from federal precedent suggests that the court 
engaged in making a policy decision. In fact, the dissent in Gementera 
characterized the decision as “bad policy.”81 If as a society, we decide to 
adopt Eighteenth Century style public humiliation penalties, it should be 
accomplished through legislatures82 that are better equipped to evaluate 
the merit of such important policy shifts.83 Indeed, Justice Breyer 
specifically stated that courts must consider “other statutory concerns”84 
indicating that courts cannot invent sentences contrary to statutory law. 
The bottom line is that the Guidelines were still in place in August 2004 
when the Ninth Circuit handed down Gementera and this analysis 
illustrates the damage courts can potentially do when they stray too far 
from proper discretion and usurp legislative authority. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 79. U.S. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 80. Id. at 757 (citations omitted). 
 81. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 612 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 82. This Note is not suggesting that society should implement shaming penalties; indeed, the 
opposite is true. 
 83. See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some 
Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 75 (2000). 
 84. Id. at 651-52. 
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C. The Gementera Decision Neglected to Give Proper Consideration to 
the Goals of Deterrence and Protecting the Public 
 
Perhaps one of the most striking examples that illustrate the 
Gementera Court’s overreaching is a blatant disregard for the Guidelines 
dual goals of deterrence and protecting the public.85 In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit clearly stated that it would not consider these goals in view of its 
holding that the provision of the punishment “reasonably related to the 
legitimate statutory objective of rehabilitation.”86 This is a clear example 
of a court circumventing the legislative process. These factors, 
particularly deterrence, should receive full consideration from the court 
under the Guidelines and under the circumstances involved in 
Germentera. 
Advocates of shaming argue that humiliation sentences deter future 
crimes from being committed by both the public and the offender.87 The 
conventional wisdom is that the public will see the consequences of the 
criminal behavior and abstain from participating in similar conduct for 
fear of becoming the next example.88 Proponents additionally contend 
that public humiliation helps the offender to recognize and forsake the 
misconduct.89  This reasoning remains weak in regard to deterrence and 
public protection because the government cannot assess with certainty 
how the public will react to public spectacles of this nature.90
France’s history with humiliation teaches us that shaming “‘excited 
the evil passions of the populace,’ creating difficult problems for the 
police.”91 Indeed, shaming sanctions have caused riots and significant 
crowd control issues.92 One commentator also noted that beyond riots, 
“[o]ther things happen too—things are more difficult to detect and 
therefore more disturbing. Who knows how private persons will treat the 
shamed john, the shamed merchant, the shamed shoplifter, the shamed 
drunk driver?”93 The fact of the matter is that humiliation penalties 
frequently have the effect of causing further criminal conduct rather than 
deterring it. 
Gementera’s sentence would unlikely create the mob scenes played 
 85. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 607. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 601. 
 88. Id. at 602. 
 89. Id. 
 90. James Q. Whitman, ESSAY: What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1083 (1998).  France, similar to colonial America and Great Britain, commonly employed 
public humiliation in punishments until the mid 19th Century.  Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1088. 
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out in 19th century France and other parts of continental Europe. 
Nevertheless, the unpredictability of the manner in which private 
individuals would react to Gementera’s penalty, especially if it were a 
violent reaction, is extremely relevant to the issue here. Who is to say 
that the next court will not implement a provision that goes further and 
does have the effect of inciting a mob? The fact that the majority failed 
to consider the potentially negative effect shaming penalties may have on 
deterrence bolsters the argument that the imposition of this form of 
punishment is an issue for legislative bodies to decide, not the courts. 
 
V. IN CIRCUMVENTING THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, THE GEMENTERA 
COURT CREATED SEVERAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
A. The Gementera Decision Will Likely Foster Disrespect for the Legal 
System and Raise Questions Regarding Whether Humiliation Constitutes 
Just Punishment 
 
In addition to the three goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
protecting the public, the Guidelines state that sentences need “to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense . . . .”94 Both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit majority articulated how humiliation would 
sufficiently impose upon Gementera the seriousness of his actions.95 
However, the accomplishment of the latter two purposes remains suspect 
under the Gementera court’s reasoning. 
First, the court never explains how humiliation promotes respect for 
the law. Interestingly, the majority concedes that “the district court’s 
sandwich board condition was somewhat crude . . . .”96 The dissent later 
refers to one commentator’s observation that the first part of shaming “is 
an attempt to debase, degrade, or humiliate the offender . . . .”97  How 
can court-sanctioned penalties that are “crude” and that “degrade” foster 
respect for the law? One could counter the argument that these “crude” 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2004). 
 95. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit quoted the 
language of the district court:  
This is a young man who needs to be brought face-to-face with the consequences of his 
conduct. He’s going down the wrong path in life. At age 24, committing this kind of an 
offense, he’s already in a criminal history category 4, two-thirds of the way up the 
criminal history scale. He needs a wake-up call. 
Id. at 604. 
 96. Id. at 606. 
 97. Id. at 611 (Hawkins, J,. dissenting) (quoting Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments 
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2178 (Nov. 2001)). 
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and “degrading” punishments foster respect by forcing observers to 
respect the law for fear that they will become the next public spectacle. 
However, it must be considered whether or not respect founded in fear of 
becoming a public spectacle is the type of respect government wants. 
Authoritarian governments, such as the colonial American government, 
the current communist Chinese government, and the former Taliban in 
Afghanistan tend to embrace public humiliation.98 These governments 
gain the respect of their citizens in the sense of keeping law and order, 
but it is hard to imagine that our modern society would have much 
respect for such methodology. One must exercise caution not to compare 
this decision with the evils associated with the Taliban, however, 
governments that embrace shaming tend to lack the true respect and 
admiration associated with our enlightened understanding of liberty 
articulated in the Declaration of Independence.99
The Guidelines also require that sentences “provide just punishment 
for the offense.”100 Shaming sanctions elicit serious constitutional 
concerns and raise questions of poor public policy. Even if these 
penalties are able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the fact that they 
raise so many questions suggests that they are not “just” punishments. 
 
B. A Legislative Body Would Likely Discover the Ill-Effects That 
Shaming Penalties Have on Rehabilitation. 
 
The Gementera court’s failure to consider the full range of issues 
associated with shaming represents perhaps the most dangerous 
consequence of the courts usurpation of legislative authority.  
Regrettably, the court’s only rationale for humiliation was the following: 
 
While humiliation may well be—indeed—likely will be—a feature of 
defendant’s experience in standing before a post office with such a 
sign, the humiliation or shame he experiences should serve the salutary 
purpose of bringing defendant in close touch with the real significance 
of the crime he has acknowledged committing. Such an experience 
should have a specific rehabilitative effect on defendant that could not 
be accomplished by other means, certainly not by a more extended term 
of imprisonment.101
 
The court should have offered greater justification for humiliating 
 98. Whitman, supra note 87, at 1059, 1082. 
 99. See The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 101. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 602. 
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Gementera other than “bringing [the] defendant in close touch with the 
real significance of [his] crime . . . [will] have a specific rehabilitative 
effect on [the] defendant . . . .”102 Several additional factors involving 
shaming penalties exist for which legislative bodies are more aptly 
equipped to address. 
One of the most alarming factors overlooked by the court is the 
effect of shaming penalties on third parties. Returning to Hawthorne’s 
novel, Pearl, the daughter of Hester, serves as another reminder of the 
inappropriateness of shaming.103 Pearl was the innocent outcome of 
Hester’s indiscretion. Yet, she suffered alongside her mother and never 
became an integrated member of her community.104 One need not look 
far to find modern-day embodiments of Pearl’s character. A very striking 
example occurred in New Jersey when a recently widowed “father of 
three killed himself when he saw his name in the paper” for soliciting a 
prostitute.105 Of course, this man made the decision to commit suicide, 
but his orphaned children were the indirect victims of shaming. The 
impact on this and other families in similar circumstances is 
immeasurable. The following quote likely summarizes the effects 
families incur when one member receives a shaming sentence:  
 
Kids are ridiculed; marriages are probably going to be broken up. The 
question is, is the kind of deterrent value [judges] are trying to gain 
worth the damage done to people innocent of this crime?  I cannot 
imagine it is worth it. There are some very substantial costs.106
 
Another staggering effect of public humiliation ignored by the Ninth 
Circuit is the wide range of psychological reactions to shaming.107 It may 
be true that public humiliation rehabilitates some offenders108 but others 
may become withdrawn, depressed, or even angry.109 Still others may 
 102. Id. 
 103. Garcia, supra note 12, at 128. 
 104. Garcia, supra note 12, at 128. 
 105. Courtney Guyton Persons, Note: Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, 
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitute’s Patrons, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (1996). It should be noted that the local newspaper, not the judiciary, 
decided to publish this incident on its own. The point here, however, is still relevant to this analysis 
because in Florida, Judge Larry Shack required that a mother confess her sin of distributing drugs in 
a local newspaper. The unfortunate outcome of in the instant example could just as easily occur if a 
judge, rather than a newspaper, ordered a publication proclaiming the offender’s transgressions. See 
Sanders, supra note 69, at 368. 
 106. Deni Smith Garcia, Notes & Comments: Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach to the 
Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 118 (1999). 
 107. Id. at 121. 
 108. Id. at 122. 
 109. Id. at 121-22. 
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wear their “Scarlet Letter” as a badge of honor.110 The theory backing 
shaming is rooted in the idea that offenders will feel shame and remorse 
for their crimes.111 However, many criminals who come before courts 
already have low self-esteem.112 Therefore, it logically follows that many 
offenders will not internalize the conduct as morally wrong.113  The fact 
is, psychologists cannot accurately predict how an individual will react to 
public shaming.114 Cast in this light, it becomes apparent that the notion 
of “rehabilitation” in any given case is a wild card, subject to the 
circumstances of the case. It follows then, that the rationale that shaming 
serves as a rehabilitative tool often fails. 
Commendably, the court did include a provision stating that 
Gementera could opt out of the shaming penalty upon proof that he 
would suffer psychological harm.115 While this was a prudent step, the 
issue remains that legislatures are more qualified to evaluate the potential 
pitfalls and benefits of implementing this public policy than is the 
judiciary. For example, legislatures can conduct studies116 and debate on 
a wider scale. Legislative debate and consideration generally 
accommodate a more reasonable balance between competing public 
policy issues117 and thus result in a more equitable outcome.118 
Legislative guidelines also restrict the possibility that judges will “act 
upon their personal biases and prejudices, personal morality, or pop 
psychological theories.”119 Not only will legislatures do a better job than 
judges of addressing the public policy concerns related to shaming, but 
also the public will perceive the “system as essentially fair, just, and 
even-handed . . . [rather than] quirky, eccentric, and [engaged in] 
idiosyncratic sentencing practices.”120
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 111. Id. at 122. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 116. See Horwitz, supra note 83, at 160. 
 117. Id. 
 118. While this Note stands for the proposition that the legislative branch should implement 
policy of this nature, it is important to note that the judiciary is in a better position to evaluate 
individual cases. 
 119. Horwitz, supra note 83, at 160. 
 120. Horwitz, supra note 83, at 160. 
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C.  The Ninth Circuit Failed to Reconcile Modern-Day Circumstances 
with Those of the Past That Were Favorable to the Effective Use of 
Shaming Penalties 
 
Shaming was an effective deterrent to crime in colonial America.121 
The primary factors for its effectiveness included the governing 
theocracy,122 the interdependence of the colonial citizenry,123 and the lack 
of mobility.124 These factors are either nonexistent or severely limited 
today. Applying these factors to Gementera, it is apparent that none of 
these historical factors are relevant. San Francisco is not a theocracy and 
Gementera was not dependant on the residents of the city for his 
survival. Finally, one could hardly assert that San Francisco residents 
suffer from a lack of mobility. Therefore, it may be asked, why did the 
court impose a shaming sanction? The court offers no explanation of 
how this penalty is effective in light of shaming’s historical context. 
A legislative body would likely consider the fact that humiliation 
sentences fell out of favor in light of modern developments and 
enlightened thinking embodied in the Declaration of Independence. 
However, the court neglected these considerations and now Gementera’s 
precedent encompasses some of the most rural areas of the United States 
such as parts of Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, and Alaska. While residents in 
these areas are probably not dependent on each other for survival and not 
subjects of a theocracy, many, especially poor persons in Hawaii and 
Alaska, are essentially immobile. Although Scarlet Letter punishments 
could be an effective deterrent to crime in some of these rural areas, the 
bottom line is that the court applied a humiliation sanction in an urban 
center where the penalty will unlikely have much of an effect. The Court 
fails to address how applying the same penalty in a rural region could 
prove effective in an urban area. These factors, viewed collectively, 
illustrate that this dynamic problem deserves nothing less than a full, rich 
legislative debate. 
 
D.  The Gementera Decision Is Inconsistent with Other Federal 
Decisions and Creates Poor Precedent 
 
Uniformity is one of the reasons for the Guidelines.125 The fact that 
 121. Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light – “Scarlet 
Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America Because It Deprives 
Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 97 (2001). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 606 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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shaming sentences are rare in the federal system shows that this decision 
is out of step. Indeed, the court frankly admitted “that one purpose of the 
Sentencing Guidelines was to promote greater uniformity in federal 
sentencing, and that permitting certain conditions of supervised release, 
as imposed here, may lead to less regularized sentences.”126 
Unfortunately, Gementera is more than an anomaly; it is an example of 
the dangers presented by courts exercising authority better left to elected 
bodies. 
Congress, an elected body accountable to the people, determined that 
there should be some level of uniformity in the sentencing process. Even 
if one does not agree with the Guidelines, as this author does not, one 
must concede that reserving power to the legislature to set standards 
regarding public policy is wise127 because it prevents judges from 
imposing their own morality.128 The Gementera majority openly 
admitted that the district court’s one hundred hour provision constituted a 
“difficult case.”129 Interestingly, however, the district court judge had no 
problem whatsoever with the one hundred hour requirement. He 
explained that “Gementera should have to suffer the ‘humiliation of 
having to stand and be labeled in front of people coming and going from 
a post office as somebody who has stolen mail.’”130  The district court 
judge saw humiliation in a different light than the Ninth Circuit. This 
illustrates the proposition that courts should at least follow some 
 126. Id. at 606. 
 127. Indeed, the Supreme Court has affirmed the notion that authority properly rests with 
legislative bodies on the matter of setting standards. The Court has held that: 
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a 
democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, 
within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. 
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become 
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing 
between competing political, economic and social pressures.  . . . [W]e should not allow 
our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our 
distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases such as these. The 
temptations to cross that policy line are very great.” 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring affirmance of judgment)). The Court also held that: 
[T]herefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature 
against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the 
legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not 
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on 
those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175. 
 128. While authority rests with Congress to determine general sentencing standards, Justice 
Stewart explained that our system of checks and balances enables the Court to “safeguard 
individuals from the abuse of legislative power.”  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174. 
 129. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 606. 
 130. Id. at 596, 611 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
   
499] PUBLIC SHAMING PENALTIES 515 
 
guidelines prescribed by legislatures. Otherwise, who is to say that the 
next court will not believe that five hundred or one thousand hours of 
public humiliation is necessary for rehabilitation? 
To the Ninth Circuit’s credit, it included the following paragraph 
acknowledging that courts have responsibility to defer to legislatures: 
 
[W]e are careful not to articulate a principle broader than that 
presented by the facts of this case. With care and specificity, the district 
court outlined a sensible logic underlying its conclusion that a set of 
conditions, including the signboard provision, but also including 
reintegrative provisions, would better promote this defendant’s 
rehabilitation and amendment of life than would a lengthier term of 
incarceration. By contrast, a per se rule that the mandatory public airing 
of one’s offense can never assist an offender to reassume his duty of 
obedience to the law would impose a narrow penological orthodoxy not 
contemplated by the Guidelines’ express approval of “any other 
condition [the district court] considers to be appropriate.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d).131
 
Many agree that the prison system needs reform. Operating under 
this premise, the court was probably correct in determining that the 
additional reintegration provisions “better promote[d] this defendant’s 
rehabilitation and amendment of life than would a lengthier term of 
incarceration.”132 However, this does not change the fact that the 
imposition of shaming penalties departs from federal precedent. Nor does 
it alter the conclusion that it is inappropriate to impose shaming 
sanctions, especially without the benefit of legislative debate. The dissent 
emphasized that the majority considered the shaming “conditionally 
acceptable because it was ‘coupled with more socially useful 
provisions.’”133 Such reasons justify neither departing from precedent nor 
disregarding congressional intent. 
 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF SHAMING PENALTIES 
 
A.  Probation Conditions and the Constitution 
 
The return of shaming sanctions to U.S. courts is troubling in light of 
constitutional jurisprudence. Though courts have yet to find shaming 
 131. Id. at 607. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 611 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
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sanctions per se unconstitutional,134 legitimate debate persists regarding 
humiliation in relation to the Constitution. In fact, an amicus brief filed 
on Gementera’s behalf, raised First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns.135 Gementera additionally cited potential pitfalls regarding the 
Eighth Amendment.136
Before evaluating the constitutional validity of humiliation 
sentences, it is necessary to note that supervised release conditions, 
whether they involve house arrest or humiliation, may severely limit a 
probationer’s constitutional rights.137 One commentator, discussing the 
limited rights of probationers, quipped, “in light of . . . probationers’ 
lesser constitutional rights, it seems unlikely that courts will invalidate 
scarlet letter sanctions on constitutional grounds, provided the sentences 
do not rise to extreme levels.”138 However, despite probationers’ limited 
rights, when impinging upon constitutional rights, district courts “must 
review . . . restrictions with particular care.”139 Furthermore, in the Ninth 
Circuit, “probation conditions that impose on constitutional rights are 
entitled to heightened scrutiny.”140 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit created 
the following two-part test to determine the constitutionality of the 
discretionary conditions of a supervised release: 1) the sentencing judge 
must impose the conditions for permissible purposes, and 2) the 
conditions must reasonably relate to the purposes of rehabilitation and 
protecting the public.141
 134. Id. at 609. 
 135. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Public Defender in the Northern District of 
California, 2003 WL 23273930, at 19, U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
10103).
 136. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 607. 
 137. Kenya A. Jenkins, Comment, “Shaming” Probation Penalties and the Sexual Offender: A 
Dangerous Combination, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 86 (2002). 
 138. Morton, supra note 6, at 117-18. 
 139. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Public Defender in the Northern District of 
California, 2003 WL 23273930, at 18, U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
10103) (citing United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Peete, 
919 F.2d 1168, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 140. US v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1981). Concerning heightened 
scrutiny, the Consuelo-Gonzalez court wrote: 
Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may 
properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact 
serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety. But this is not to say that 
there is any presumption, however weak, that such limitations are impermissible. Rather, 
it is necessary to recognize that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be done 
sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement must serve the broad 
purposes of the Probation Act. This burden cannot be avoided by asserting either that the 
probationer has voluntarily waived his rights by not objecting in a proper manner to the 
conditions imposed upon him or that he must accept any condition the court “deems best” 
as a consequence of being “in custody.” 
Id. 
 141. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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The Gementera court declined to address the defendant’s First, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment claims because an amici raised these issues 
rather than Gementera.142 While the court properly declined to hear 
issues raised for the first time through amicus,143 it is unfortunate that the 
court failed to deliberate on these issues. At the very least, careful 
consideration of each of these constitutional amendments calls into 
question this sentence as measured against the Ninth Circuit’s two-part 
test.    
 
B.  First Amendment Challenges to Public Humiliation 
 
First Amendment jurisprudence teaches us that citizens generally 
cannot be compelled to engage in speech. For example, the Supreme 
Court’s famous 1943 case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, clearly established the doctrine that a state could not require 
teachers and students to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag.144 The 
Court remained faithful to this principle more than three decades later in 
its renowned Wooley v. Maynard decision.145 In Wooley, the Court found 
that Vermont erred in forcing its residents to drive with the license plate 
slogan “live free or die.”146 The Wooley Court observed “the right to 
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concepts of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”147
Gementera’s probation condition clearly compelled him to speak his 
mind.148 Therefore, even though Gementera’s rights were limited as a 
probationer, this limitation would have triggered an analysis under the 
heightened scrutiny standard.149
Under the higher standard, the shame sanction likely fails. Regarding 
the permissible purpose prong, the court improperly circumvented the 
legislative intent of the Guidelines. The plain language of the Guidelines 
provides no evidence indicating that Congress intended for humiliation 
 142. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 143. See Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 
1141 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 144. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 145. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 146. Id. at 714. 
 147. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Public Defender in the Northern District of 
California, 2003 WL 23273930, at 20, U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
10103) (some citations omitted) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)). 
 148. Id.
 149. See supra note 140. Again, this heightened standard requires that 1) the sentencing judge 
impose the conditions for permissible purposes, and that 2) the conditions must reasonably relate to 
the purposes of rehabilitation and protecting the public. U.S. v. Gemetera, 379 F.3d 596, 601 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
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to be part of rehabilitation.150 Additionally, as the dissent notes, the 
Gementera decision is not consistent with federal precedent.151 Justice 
Hawkins, elaborating on the deviation from precedent wrote, “There is 
precious little federal authority on sentences that include shaming 
components, perhaps indicative of a recognition that whatever legal 
justification may be marshaled in support of sentences involving public 
humiliation, they simply have no place in the majesty of an Article III 
courtroom.”152 The court neglected to give full and proper consideration 
to many of the important issues surrounding shaming, such as its effects 
on the general public and innocent third parties, thereby further 
indicating that the court had impermissibly imposed the humiliation 
condition.153
The shaming sanction did not reasonably relate to rehabilitation nor 
did it adequately address public safety issues. On the count of not 
reasonably relating to rehabilitation, courts cannot properly gauge the 
psychological reactions of a probationer.154 Additionally, there is little or 
no federal authority to serve as a guide to determine whether shaming 
does indeed rehabilitate. Therefore, it follows that the Ninth Circuit does 
not know whether Gementera’s probation condition reasonably relates to 
Gementera’s rehabilitation. Finally, the court, by its own admission, 
decided against addressing the issue of dealing with public safety.155
 
C.  The Fifth Amendment and Self-Incrimination 
 
Just as the Ninth Circuit declined to address First Amendment 
arguments in Gementera, the court refused to entertain Fifth Amendment 
claims. Amicus, however, highlighted some potential flaws in this 
approach. Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the State of California 
could also prosecute Gementera.156 The United States Supreme Court has 
held that “an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against peace and dignity of man and may be 
punished by each.”157 Amicus correctly reasoned that these provisions 
potentially placed Gementera “in a Hobson’s choice dilemma of either 
 150. See supra Part IV.A. 
 151. See supra Part V.D; see also Gementera, 379 F.3d at 611 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 152. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 611 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 153. See supra Part V.B. 
 154. See Garcia, supra note 12, at 120-21. 
 155. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 607. 
 156. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Public Defender in the Northern District of 
California, 2003 WL 23273930, at 23, U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
10103).
 157. Id. (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (citing Westfall v. U.S., 274 
U.S. 256, 258 (1927)).
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incriminating himself or violating the terms of his supervised release.”158 
Amicus further noted the following: 
 
To protect his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant must refuse to 
perform the condition and instead face the revocation of his supervised 
release. Supervised release conditions that force a defendant into such a 
situation in violation of due process, can never be reasonably related to 
the required goals of deterrence, public safety, or rehabilitation under 
these circumstances.159
 
This analysis reveals an important point. Almost without exception 
state courts have heard Fifth Amendment claims regarding humiliation. 
Perhaps the reason why no court has found shaming unconstitutional 
under the Fifth Amendment is precisely because there were no federal 
claims. Hence, the public humiliation did not incriminate the probationer 
on pending federal action and did not violate the Fifth Amendment. The 
unfortunate aspect of this case is the fact that it has not been tried at the 
state level. If the State of California decided to prosecute Gementera, he 
would likely find that his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
himself had been violated. 
 
D.  Eighth Amendment Concerns with Shaming 
 
Of all the arguments articulated against public shaming, the Eighth 
Amendment is the most common. In fact, the Gementera court directly 
addressed this issue while refusing to comment on the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.160 To date, no court has invalidated a shaming 
penalty on grounds of an Eighth Amendment argument.161 However, 
there is a lot of room for interpretation depending upon the manner in 
which one reads Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The following 
paragraph from the Gementera court explains how other courts have 
interpreted this constitutional amendment: 
 
[The Eighth Amendment] . . . forbids the infliction of “cruel and 
unusual punishments. The basic concept underlying the Eight 
Amendment was nothing less than the dignity of man.” Consistent with 
human dignity, the state must exercise its power to punish ‘“within the 
limits of civilized standards.’” A particular punishment violates the 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.
 160. Gementera, 379 F.3d at 607-08. 
 161. Id. at 608-09. 
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Eighth Amendment if it constitutes one of “‘those modes or acts of 
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that 
the Bill of Rights was adopted.’” Shaming sanctions of far greater 
severity were common in the colonial era . . . . The [Eighth] 
Amendment’s prohibition extends beyond those practices deemed 
barbarous in the 18th century, however . . . . “The words of the 
Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static. The 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ‘Fines, 
imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the 
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these 
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.’” In assessing what 
standards have so evolved, [a court looks] “to those of modern 
American society as a whole,” relying upon ‘“objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent,’” rather than [the court’s] “own conceptions 
of decency.”162
 
Precedent may invalidate Eighth Amendment challenges because 
courts evaluate this under a historical meaning of cruel and unusual 
punishment at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. Wearing a 
sandwich board declaring that you are a thief clearly does not exceed 
standards in place in 1789. However, precedent also indicates that courts 
may consider the “evolving standard of decency that marks the progress 
of a maturing society.”163 Reasonable persons can disagree on whether 
Gementera’s punishment exceeded decency in our society. Clearly, the 
Eighth Amendment raises many vexing questions regarding the prudence 
of the policy of humiliation. 
 
E.  Humiliation, Mail Thieves, and Equal Protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
 
Amicus challenged the court’s assertion that mail thieves constitute 
appropriate subjects for humiliation while the court has not deemed 
shame appropriate for most other categories of criminals.164 The court 
 162. Id. at 608 (citations omitted). 
 163. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005). Roper recently invalidated the death 
penalty for youths under the age of eighteen. The Court relied heavily on the evolving standard of 
decency analysis. Clearly, Gementera’s punishment does not rise to the level of capital punishment 
and nothing in the Roper holding indicates how the Court would treat this punishment. However, 
one could speculate that because of the reasoning employed in Roper, if the Court ever heard a 
scarlet letter challenge, it may focus more on the evolving standard analysis as opposed to the 
historical meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. 
 164. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Public Defender in the Northern District of 
California, 2003 WL 23273930, at 25-26, U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
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reasoned that shaming was suitable because mail theft is disruptive to 
society and the sanction would help impress upon Gementera the 
seriousness of his crime.165 An Amicus points out that such a belief is 
irrational.166 The Amicus further noted: 
 
Many federal crimes disrupt people’s affairs, such as assaults, 
burglaries on federal land, and securities fraud. The court offers no 
legitimate purpose for the assertion that the humiliation a mail thief 
feels when forced to wear a sandwich board in public will aptly punish 
the crime of mail theft, as opposed to other ‘disruptive’ crimes a 
defendant could be convicted of.167
 
Classifying mail thieves in an arbitrary manner suggests that the 
defendant’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
may have been violated. Indeed, he Ninth Circuit has not made a practice 
of employing similar sentences; therefore, it must be asked why in this 
case such punishments were in order. Why, for example, did the court 
choose to shame Gementera, a seemingly unsympathetic individual, of 
little influence, residing in one of our nation’s largest metropolitan areas. 
The court’s choice on this occasion to implement shaming punishments 
is indeed suspicious. As indicated previously, studies show that shaming 
under these conditions is ineffective and ultimately contributed to the 
decline of humiliation sanctions in America.168
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In Gementera, the Ninth Circuit highlighted the fact that an 
estimated two-thirds of inmates released from prison during 2004 will 
find themselves behind bars again within a few years.169 In light of this 
statistic, the court was probably correct in reasoning that extended 
incarceration would not be in Gementera’s best interest.170 Accordingly, 
Gementera’s probation condition required him to observe customers 
visiting postal facilities’ lost mail windows, and in all likelihood, that 
requirement quite effectively served to reintegrate Gementera into 
society. Most reasonable persons would probably agree that such 
provisions are not extreme and constitute a proper exercise of judicial 
10103).
 165. See id at 26. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.
 168. See supra Part II.B. 
 169. U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 170. Id. at 603. 
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discretion. However, shaming provisions are not always clear and 
implementing them represents a change in policy that demands much 
more vigorous debate than is afforded by courts. Society should 
experiment with alternative forms of punishment and strive to reform our 
prisons. However, it is imperative that we implement solutions through 
proper channels to ensure that persons are not degraded and that 
constitutional rights remain respected. 
In this case, if a branch of government decided that the policy of 
shaming were the solution to reforming our system, Congress would 
have been the proper body to set the policy. Congress could have an 
open, honest debate about the merits of whether shaming rehabilitates 
and furthermore, its members would find themselves accountable to the 
people. More importantly, if Congress passed legislation containing 
constitutionally suspect provisions, the judiciary could strike down the 
statute. In short, this would uphold our system of checks and balances 
and maintain the safeguard that keeps the judicial branch from becoming 
blind to constitutional concerns – after all, it is difficult to be an impartial 
judge of one’s own policy. One cannot help but wonder if the Ninth 
Circuit would have been more concerned about the First, Fifth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment problems had it not been so busy defending 
its own policy.171
Society should reject public humiliation as a legitimate punishment 
no matter which branch of government chooses to adopt the policy. 
Justice Hawkins, writing for the dissent in Gementera, made the wise 
observation that even if there were justification for shaming, society 
should still reject the practice because “[a] fair measure of a civilized 
society is how its institutions behave in the space between what it may 
have the power to do and what it should do.”172
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